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The political inuence of peer groups:
experimental evidence in the classroom
Camila F. S. Campos Shaun Hargreaves Heapy
Fernanda Leite Lopez de Leonz
Abstract
People who belong to the same group often behave alike. Is this
because people with similar preferences naturally associate with each other or
because group dynamics cause individual preferences and/or the information
that they have to converge? We address this question with a natural
experiment. We nd no evidence that peer political identication a¤ects
individual identication. But we do nd that peer engagement a¤ects political
identication: a more politically engaged peer group encourages individual
political a¢ liation to move from the extremes to the centre.
JEL classication: D71, I23, Z19
1 Introduction
People often behave alike when they know each other well. Friends, for example,
frequently vote for the same party, send their children to similar schools, choose
the same types of vacations or enjoy eating at certain restaurants and not others.
Groups are formed by such commonalities and they pose a fundamental question for
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social science. Do such commonalities arise because people with prior preferences
for x naturally associate with fellow x seekers and share information or does
membership of the group encourage conformity because the psychological dynamics
within a group are such that individual preferences become more alike? This is
the question that we address in this paper with a natural experiment, focusing on
political behaviour.
The question matters because much in economics and some versions of liberal
political theory turns on taking individual preferences as given. The appeal, for
instance, of the Pareto criterion in welfare economics and the will of the people
as a justication for democratic decision making depends on being able to identify
individuals with their preference and this becomes problematic if an individuals
preferences change with those of their peers.1 The question, however, is di¢ cult to
answer. To control adequately for possible prior commonalities, common shocks and
the role of information transmission within a group, and so identify whether there is
a distinct peer e¤ect on individual preferences, is not easy. This is why experiments,
where the scope for such control is often greater, are attractive. The laboratory ex-
perimental evidence, however, is mixed on this general question. For example, Hung
and Plott (2001) interpret the evidence from their information cascade experiment
as telling in favour of information transmission and against preference change in the
explanation of behavioural conformity. But, the evidence on the unpredictability
of music bandwagons in the Salganik et al. (2006) experiment is di¢ cult to rec-
oncile with information transmission alone. In this paper, we report on a natural
experiment where we attempt to disentangle the contribution of prior commonalities
and the possible information transmission e¤ect within a group from the possible
inuence that peers have on other individualsspecic political preferences.
In particular, we consider whether there is evidence of peer e¤ects on two types
of individual political behaviours. One is an individuals substantive political iden-
tication on a left-right spectrum and the other is on an individuals engagement
1Of course, the normative appeal of democracy need not depend on this property of aggregating
pre-existing individual views. The deliberative virtues of democracy depend, in principle, instead
on being able to persuade others to a di¤erent point of view.
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with the process of politics that is revealed by their acquisition of information on
candidates in an election and their willingness to vote in an election.2 Where there
is evidence that peers political identication and/or engagement a¤ects individual
political identication and/or engagement, we exploit aspects of the data to consider
whether it arises from a peer inuence on the political information that individuals
have or over their preferences.
There is a large literature on peer e¤ects in politics.3 The specic evidence on
peer e¤ects on political identication is mixed. Some studies nd evidence con-
sistent with the claim that people follow their peers political a¢ liations (Sinclair,
2009; Beck, 2002; Kenny, 1994), others nd no association (MacKuen and Brown,
1987). But much of this is based on correlations that are subject to selection biases:
that is, the correlations could arise from people with shared prior commonalities
naturally being drawn together. We address this di¢ culty in the natural experi-
ment by exploiting the fact that our data consists of freshman students who have
been randomly divided between di¤erent class groups for the introductory courses
in their chosen major subject. This means that the characteristics of the peers in
a persons class group should be independent of his or her own characteristics. We
interview students twice in an election year (before the presidential campaign and
after the Election). To test for peer e¤ects, we examine how and whether their
identication and engagement in the second survey correlates with their classmates
2Given the Public Choice insights with respect to rational ignorance and the paradox of
voting, an individual willingness to acquire information and/or vote is often regarded as indicating
that individual has some kind of a social preferencethat is revealed by this kind of engagement
with politics. Thus we examine political behaviours where there are both personal and social
preferences that are plausibly in play.
3Many studies investigate how individualsbehavior is associated with the behaviour or charac-
teristics of their household members (Nickerson, 2008), people who live in the same geographical
and residential area (Cho, 2003; Cho et al.; 2006, Huckfeldt and Mendez, 2008, Huckfeldt et
al.,1995, Huckfeldt and Sprague, 1987), housemates (Klofstad 2009; 2010), discussion partners
(Huckfeldt, 2007, Mutz, 2002a, 2002b; Gerber et al., 2012), co-workers (Mutz and Mondak, 2006)
or facebook friends (Bond et al. 2012).Others look at indirect measures of peer e¤ects: e.g.,
Gentzkow and Shapiro (2011) compare the degree of ideological segregation in the consumption of
media among friends and family.
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initial political orientations and engagement.
There are other studies that use an experimental or quasi-experimental frame-
work for the same reason. For example, Sacerdote (2001), Carrell et al. (2011)
and Lyle (2009) use data on randomly assigned networks to identify peer e¤ects
on, respectively, student performance, physical tness and workers productivity.
The closest to our study are the natural and eld experiments that have exam-
ined peer e¤ects on voting turnout (Funk, 2010; Panagopoulos, 2010; Gerber et al.
2008, Nickerson, 2008 and Klofstad, 2009, 2010.) Their ndings are consistent with
the fact that voting is contagious in social circles. But little is known about the
mechanism producing conformity in this instance. Does it arise because individuals
become better informed about political choices through interaction with peers and
so become more inclined to vote? Or do peer preferences for political engagement
strengthen what would otherwise be weak individual preferences for political en-
gagement?4 The di¤erence matters for the reason sketched above and our natural
experiment is useful in distinguishing between these possible explanations of peer
e¤ects on likelihood of voting, as well as other aspects of political behaviour.
We nd no evidence that peer political identication inuences individual polit-
ical identication. Interestingly, when we relax the controls for prior commonalities
among the members of a group, we nd an apparent peer political identication
e¤ect on individual political identication. This suggests that the failure to control
fully for prior commonalities can, in practice, be a serious problem: it can lead to
misleading inferences over the sensitivity of individual behaviour to peers.
We do nd evidence, however, of a peer engagement e¤ect on individual political
identication and possibly on the willingness to vote. This might seem troubling
for those who take preferences as given, especially as there is no evidence that this
4These are open questions. Claudine Gay (2009) discusses the lack of knowledge about the
subject in putting forward her perspective about the Future of Political Science: We know rela-
tively little about how contexts in which individuals are situated shape politically relevant beliefs
and opinions, and subsequently, behavior: What features of context matter? What are the mech-
anisms of contextual inuence? What is the range of behaviors and attitudes a¤ected? A full and
compelling account of the political life of the mass public is impossible without greater attention
to these questions.
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e¤ect arises because individuals acquire more information through the media and
only weak evidence that their political knowledge of the candidates improves. But,
the fact that peer engagement appears to encourage individual political identication
to move towards the Centre suggests a di¤erent and less troubling interpretation,
especially as there is no evidence that this e¤ect comes from the mere existence of
di¤erences in view within the peer group (as in Mutz 2002a, 2002b). It is an e¤ect
that is associated with an engaged peer group and if initial political a¢ liations are
held with some uncertainty then discussion within an engaged group can help clarify
an individuals own a¢ liation on the left-right wing scale with the result that there
is regression to the mean in the form of a movement to the Centre.
In the next section, we explain the data and describe the natural experiment on
freshman students at Brazils largest university. We set out the model that we use
for identifying peer e¤ects in Section 3. Section 4 presents the estimates of peer
e¤ects. Section 5 discusses these results and we conclude in Section 6.
2 Data and Identication of Peer E¤ects
2.1 Overview
The data is based on freshman students at the Universidade de São Paulo (USP).
The move from high school to university marks a natural transition to adulthood
where new networks are formed. USP is the largest university in Brazil and the
freshman students are randomly allocated to classrooms. As a result, these classes
plausibly represent new randomly created peer groups for the incoming students.
Our strategy was to sample these freshman students early in the academic year and
before the commencement of a Presidential campaign to establish prior values of the
individual variables relating to preferences for political a¢ liation and engagement.
For each individual, we calculate peer e¤ect variables for two key measures relating to
the political engagement and political a¢ liation. We, then, re-survey the sample at
the conclusion of the Presidential election and test whether the individual political
a¢ liation, engagement and knowledge at this later date correlates with the peer
variables.
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The choice of surveying freshman students who are entering during a Presidential
election year is important for the identication of peer e¤ects. The fact of the
election makes the transition to adulthood particularly salient because voting is
compulsory for everyone aged 18 or above in Brazil. The campaign, that occurs
between the rst and nal sample of individual variables, is also a natural political
event which might cause individuals to think about politics and so become exposed
to peer e¤ects, if there are any.
There are strong grounds for supposing that the social life in classrooms is an
appropriate environment to measure peer e¤ects. USP freshmen have all their in-
troductory lectures with the same group of classmates during their rst term in
university (when we rst interview them). They have at least two lectures together
per day5 and they interact outside the class with each other through academic ac-
tivities such as study groups and joint course projects. In addition, there are fewer
alternative university peer groups than is typically the case at UK and US univer-
sities because most students are local and live at home (74%). Classmates are the
rst group of students they meet in college and they are a relatively large pool of
possible friends (the average size of a classroom is 33 students). In short, between
our surveys, students became friends, interacted in classes, and were exposed to a
presidential campaign that made politics salient for discussions within social circles.
2.2 The Sample and Method of Data Collection
USP has approximately 86,187 students enrolled and o¤ers 229 undergraduate and
graduate courses. To be enrolled, undergraduate students have to complete sec-
ondary education and pass an entrance exam ( Vestibular), which is USP-major
specic and runs once a year. USP is a public university, that is tuition-free, and
it is one of the most prestigious universities in Latin America. For these reasons,
the USP entrance exam is highly competitive: for instance, in 2011, the number of
5Students in morning courses have two lectures per day, from 7:30 to 11AM, while students in
evening have lectures from 7:30 to 11PM.
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applicants was 138,888 and the years enrolment was only 10,202.6
Our data come from 2010 freshman students enrolled in specic subject majors:
architecture, business administration, economics, history, law, literature, mathemat-
ics, physics, and sociology. For these majors, USP admits more than 180 students
per year and divides the freshmen into at least two classes for the introductory
courses. While students obviously choose their subject major, they cannot choose
their class assignment: it is based either on alphabet order or a university algorithm.
Since the initial process of allocating students to classes is random, our classes and
the peer variables should be free from the more obvious sources of selection bias.7
The same survey procedure was used in all classes. An interviewer entered the
classroom about 15 minutes before the end of a lecture, read an introductory script
aloud, and distributed the questionnaires to all students. Lecturers also contributed
by asking that attention and consideration be given to the survey. Students, then,
had 10-12 minutes to ll out, individually, the questionnaires. The survey was titled
Young AdultsPolitical Behaviourand the contact details of the authors were given
for further information. The instructions made clear that students should answer the
survey individually. In every class, four types of questionnaires containing exactly
the same questions but in di¤erent order were randomly distributed to students
(to encourage individual answering). Practically all students agreed to answer the
survey (in a few classrooms, one or two students failed to return the lled-out sur-
vey), and 95.54% of the respondents declared that they had answered questions in a
serious manner. The questions are on individual demographics, political knowledge,
political identication, media consumption and their parentspolitical commitments.
6Only those students with top scores on the admission entrance exam are accepted. The level
of competition varies by major of choice. For example, in the 2011 USP admission exam, 13,545
individuals applied to study Medicine and were competing for one of the 120 vacancies available.
On the other hand, 260 individuals applied to study Mathematics, competing for one of the 112
places available (http://www.fuvest.br/estat/insreg.html?anofuv=2011, last accessed 30 Septem-
ber 2016). More information about USP follows here: http://www5.usp.br/ (last accessed 30
September 2016).
7Table A1 in the online Appendix describes the number of classrooms and allocation rule per
major-class.
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The rst wave, pre-election, was administrated during April 2010 (henceforth,
referred to as t-1). The questionnaires were collected before the formal entry of all
candidates in the race or of their running mates (in June) and before the beginning
of the TV presidential campaign (in July) or any of the three debates on TV (in
August and September). There is also evidence that media interest in the election
notably picked up after the rst wave.8 So it is likely that people tended to form
opinions and discuss politics more enthusiastically from July on and after the rst
wave.
Nevertheless, it is possible that some peer e¤ects had already occurred by the
time of the rst wave because it was conducted roughly one month after the be-
ginning of classes. To test for this possibility we conduct several tests for random
assignment at this stage. First, following Sacerdote (2001), we use a standard test
for random selection. This is discussed in section 4.1 and does not cause any concern.
Second, we test whether the variance of peer variables across classrooms per major-
class (the randomization level) is consistent with studentsrandom assignment to
classrooms. When peer variables di¤er too much or too little (with respect to the
ones generated by a lottery), one explanation is that peer e¤ects have occurred. The
data largely reject the hypothesis that the variances are unusual.9 Based on this
evidence and the early stage of the election year, we take the rst wave of the survey
as supplying information on pre-determined characteristics.
8The television candidate advertisement broadcasts started (Silveira and De Mello,2011) and
the frequency of the mention of electionin one of the largest Brazil newspapers notably increased
after the rst wave, as did variation in election polls (see Figures A1 and A2 in the eletronic
Appendix).
9We conducted 1,000 simulations for each major-class, allocating students randomly to class-
rooms. Then we computed the variance across classrooms for each simulated classroom allocation,
and we constructed an empirical condence interval. The actual variance for the proportion of
classmates with a partisan parent was within the 10% condence interval for all majors-class. On
the other hand, the actual variance for the proportion of classmates self-declared right-wing was
out of the 10% condence interval for two (out of fteen) major-class. Our results are not sensitive
to these classrooms. We replicated the main regressions for the peer e¤ect on ideology (on Table
3) excluding these two major-class and we nd the same results. These ndings are not reported,
but are available under request.
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The second wave of the survey was administrated just after the rst round of
presidential elections, during October 2010 (henceforth, t). Students were asked the
same questions as in the rst wave, and they took a political quiz (that was piloted
beforehand to ensure all questions were clear). The data in the rst survey consisted
of 1,593 student responses from 48 classes, the data in the second wave had 1,103
student responses from 39 classes. Our panel sample consisted of the students that
had responded to both surveys, a total of 635 students.10 ;11 This is the main sample
used in the analysis. It represents 39.8% of the initial sample. Two things should
be noted about this. First, the peer variables for these individuals are calculated
on the basis of the larger initial survey of relevant individuals. Second, the panel
sample has many similarities with USP studentspopulation.12 We test for whether
the attrition is in any sense unbalanced or not random so as to bias results. We do
this in three ways.
First, we investigate if there is any correlation between abstention in the second
survey and our peer variables. We investigate this association across students within
a major-class (e.g. comparing the behaviour of students enrolled in Economics-
10The panel was identied based on responses about names, date of birth, and enrolled major.
For a few cases, we also conducted checks on studentshandwriting across surveys.
11The change in numbers between the two surveys partly occurred because the second wave of
the survey was conducted in fewer classrooms. Although all contacted teachers agreed to allow
us to survey their students during the rst wave, Law and Architecture lecturers were conducting
reviews or midterm exams during the second wave of survey. For this reason, many refused to let
us conduct the survey. Another reason for the lower number of observations in the panel is that
some students did not provide their names in the second wave and hence, we could not link their
answers to the ones in the rst survey this occurred in 17.3% of cases (=192/1103). Finally some
students missed the lecture on the day the survey was administered.
12We compared the characteristics of our sample with publicly available administrative records
for freshmen classes. The results are presented in Table A2 in the online Appendix. In general,
students in our sample are less likely to come from lower socio-economic background than the
universe of freshmen students, reecting that more a­ uent students are more likely to attend
classes (recall that USP is tuition-free). This is the population more exposed to classmates and
to peer e¤ects. It is important to note that such socio-economic selection of students is observed
both in the panel and among all students observed in the rst survey.
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evening, but that are assigned to di¤erent classrooms). We nd no association.13
In other words, variations in the proportions of classmates that self-declare right-
wing or those have a partisan parent in t-1, are unlikely to cause abstention in the
survey in t.
Second, following Good (2006), we simulate random groups to calculate an empir-
ical condence interval for panels generated randomly, and test the null hypothesis
that observed classroom panels was formed like randomly. For each classroom,
we randomly drew, from the group observed in the rst survey, a sample without
replacement, with the same size as the observed panel. We calculated the aver-
age characteristic for those selected to be in simulated panel. We repeated this
process 10,000 times to obtain an empirical 90% condence interval of the panel
characteristics, for each classroom. To summarise individualsmany characteristics
(demographics and political preferences) into a single number, we considered the
conditional probability of an individual (observed in t-1) belonging to his/her own
classroom.14 The results are presented in Table A3 in the online Appendix. They
show values for observed classrooms, as compared to the condence interval gener-
ated by the simulated groups. Out of forty seven classrooms, the null hypothesis of
a random panelis rejected, at the 10% level, for only six of them. In an alternative
check for whether attrition introduces selection in the data, we replicated tests of
selection (explained in section 4.1), for all students observed in the rst survey and
restricting the data to students in the panel, and we nd null selection e¤ects.15
Finally, we estimated the main regressions weighting each observation by the
13We estimate regressions of the following for:
Pr(Be on the panel) = Peer V ariable+major fixed effect
The coe¢ cient  is not statistically signicant for any peer variable, with p-value of at least 30%
14To construct this measure, we run OLS regressions using as dependent variable an indicator for
whether a student is in classroom c in t-1. We used the same controls in the baseline specication
in our main analysis, and consider the predicted value of a student belonging to his own classroom.
We also experimented by calculating the propensity score measure using di¤erent controls, and
nd the same results.
15The results for the restricted dataset are not shown, but available upon request.
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inverse probability of being observed in the panel.16 The magnitudes and level of
signicant of peer e¤ect coe¢ cients, reported in the eletronic Appendix, largely
remain the same.
We conclude that the attrition does not alter the sample in any visibly worrying
respect. Nevertheless, to be sure that there is no biasing e¤ect, we also control for
studentsobservable characteristics in the main regressions.
2.3 Variables
Table 1 gives descriptive statistics on the individual variables at t-1 and t and the
peer variables. The pre-determined individual characteristics at t-1 are set out in
Panel A. They relate to the usual demographics (gender, race, income, mother
education and age), their declared political a¢ liation (left-wing, centre, right-wing),
whether they have a partisan parent, whether they intend to cast an invalid vote
and whether they intend to watch the political campaign on TV.
The individual outcomes in the second survey at time t are given in Panel B. Our
measure of individual political identication is positioning on the left-right scale. A
potential concern is that this is a stable concept and so may be less susceptible to
peer inuence (forcing a null result). However, in our sample of young adults, this
turns out not to be the case: 29.3% of individuals changed their identication on
this scale between the two surveys, suggesting that, as young voters, their political
preferences were in some degree still in formation, (Prior 2010; Sears and Funk 1999;
Franklin 2004). Nevertheless, to check the robustness of our ndings, we replicate the
analysis for party preference. We also asked students to cite the three most relevant
socioeconomic problems among thirteen alternatives and we use these answers to
identify student political identication. We report these robustness results in the
online Appendix.
Our measures of individual political engagement are casting an invalid vote and
the number of days following politics in the media. Following politics need no
explanation, but casting an invalid votemay. The natural measure of a lack of
16We considered the predicted probabilities from a logit model, as weights. We regressed a
dummy for whether the individual is observed in the panel on classrooms xed e¤ects.
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engagement (not voting) is not available in Brazil because voting is compulsory.
However, there is the option on the ballot paper of voting for no one and this is
what counts as an invalid vote. Of course, this could still be construed as a protest
vote, but it does not, as it often does when voting is voluntary, suggest that person
was at least su¢ ciently engaged with politics to make the e¤ort to go to the polling
booth (e.g., see Maringoni, 2010). There is no choice over making such an e¤ort
when voting is compulsory. Instead we nd that those who cast an invalid vote
are less informed and consume less political information (see Table A4 in eletronic
Appendix), suggesting that they are less engaged.
The nal set of individual outcomes in time t are knowledge ones that come
from a quiz containing the same number of analogous questions about each of the
main Presidential candidates, Dilma Rousse¤, Jose Serra and Marina Silva.17 We
calculated the % of correct answers in the quiz, and we construct two knowledge
variables that take account of the voting intentions at the time of the rst survey.
The variable, Mistakes on Own Intended Candidate, computes the proportion of
mistakes in t made about the presidential candidate the student intended to vote for
in t-1. Similarly, we create the variable Mistakes on Remaining Candidateswhich
computes the proportion of mistakes made about the other presidential candidates.
As a more general measure of (dissimilarity of) knowledge about the candidates,
we consider the sum of the pairwise di¤erences in mistakes made about candidates
Asymmetric Mistakes.18 A higher value of this variable reects more asymmetric
knowledge and less knowledge about candidates.
The summary statistics for the peer variables are given in Panel C. The peer
political identication variable for each individual is based on their classmatesdi-
rect responses to the political identication question at t-1 (i.e., the proportion who
identify as right-wing). We have two peer political engagement variables formed in
17The quiz was piloted was piloted beforehand to ensure all questions were clear. The quiz is in
the online Appendix.
18This is dened as:
AsymmetricMistakes = jMRouseff  MSerraj+ jMRoussef  MSilvaj+ jMSerra  MSilvaj
where MC stands for the number of mistakes made about each one of the three main candidates.
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an analogous way as the % of classmates who answer in t-1 that they intend to watch
the campaign on television and the % of classmates answering that a parent prefers
a particular party. We call the latter the partisan parent peer variable. We use this
variable for several reasons. First, most students live with their parents and it would
not be surprising if politically committed parents encouraged political engagement
in their children through discussion at home, television viewing, etc. Indeed, there is
evidence that having a partisan parent is associated in the rst wave with a greater
willingness to cast a vote and watch the campaign on television than those who
do not have a partisan parent (see Table A5 in the online Appendix). Second, it
is possible that students misreport their political engagement when responding to
the direct question as to whether they intend to watch the campaign on television
because, in the context of a system of compulsory voting, this may seem like what
good citizens should do or say. In contrast, there is no obvious reason for students
to misreport whether they have a partisan parent. As a result, of these considera-
tions, partisan parents may be a more reliable indicator of student engagement in
what becomes, in e¤ect, a reduced form estimation of the inuence of peers in this
respect.19
It is important to note that although one might expect that students in a same
major-class are largely homogenous, there is sizable variation in the peer variables
within major-class (see Table A1 in the Appendix) and this is an important ingre-
dient for the identication of peer e¤ects.
Table1
3 Identication of Peer E¤ects
Following the literature on the identication peer e¤ects through experimental tech-
niques (Lyle 2007; Sacerdote 2001), we assume studentsoutcomes are a function of
19We also checked for peer e¤ects based on studentsself-reported interest in politics. The results
are qualitatively similar, but we do not present them here because this peer variable appears to
be endogenous on the basis of the analysis reported in Table 2, probably for the reasons suggested
above.
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individual and peer characteristics, as in (1).
Y tmci =  + 1X
t 1
mci + 2X
t 1
c i + 3Y
t
c i + 
t
mci (1)
The variable Y tmci, is the outcome at time t of individual i, enrolled in major-class
m, allocated to classroom c; X t 1mci corresponds to own individuals pre-determined
characteristics. The variable Y
t
c i represents the average behavior of students in
classroom c (excluding i) by t and X
t 1
c i are average characteristics of students in
classroom c (excluding i), at time t  1.
Using Manskis (1993) outline, 3 and 2 correspond respectively to endoge-
nous that represents contemporaneous and simultaneous inuence of peers and
exogenous  a sole inuence of classmates on individuals  peer e¤ects. As ex-
plained by Lyle (2007), the error term tmci can be decomposed into three terms
(tmci = 
t 1
1ci + 
t
2c + 
t
3mci), where 
t 1
1ci represents an unobserved selection term, 
t
2c
represents common shocks and t3mci represents, a standard error term. In a non-
random assignment setting, we could expect a correlation between t 11ci and the peer
variables (Y
t
c i and X
t 1
c i), as studentschoice of whom to socialise with are based to
some extent on individualstastes, which are unobservable to the researcher. This
could lead to a possible bias in the estimates for 2 and 3.
A related issue is that members of the same social group could be exposed to
common external shocks/inuences over the year (e.g., reading the same newspa-
pers and participating in the same political events), thus leading to a positive bias
for the estimates of 2 and 3. This possibility is less likely when the initial al-
location of individuals to classes is random (and we will show in Section 4.1, that
there is no evidence of intentional selection). Further, since all students in the same
major-class take the same classes and are exposed to the same college environment,
it seems plausible to assume they are exposed to similar sets of external inuences
over the election year. One important qualication, however, is that some shocks
might be particular to students in some classroom: for instance, the exposure to an
instructor with extreme political views. An underlying assumption is that the inu-
ence of punctual shocks vanishes on aggregate when considering all external shocks
at a level as ne as the classroom. This hypothesis is particularly important when
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estimating contemporaneous peer e¤ects ( 3 ), as common shocks might lead to
some correlation between t2c and Y
t
c i. For example, Lyle (2007) demonstrates that
common shocks represent a confounder for the estimate of contemporaneous peer
e¤ects (3) even in the presence of a setting with random assignment, for the reason
discussed above. Di¤erently, common shocks over the election year are unlikely to
be correlated with the distribution of studentspre-determined characteristics across
classrooms (X
t 1
c i) at the major-class level;
20 therefore, E[X
t 1
c i ; 
t
2c] = 0. For this
reason, we take the average of Y tmci across classmates and obtain (3), with Y
t
c i as a
function of Y tmci. Substituting (2) in (1) and rearranging, we obtain (3), which is the
reduced form to be estimated and depends only on predetermined characteristics.
Y
t
c i =  + 1X
t 1
mci + 2X
t 1
c i + 3Y
t
mci + !
t
mci (2)
ytmci = 0 + 1X
t 1
mci + 2X
t 1
c i + 
t
mci (3)
As a result, under random assignment, the coe¢ cient (2 =
2+32
1 33 ) captures
peers inuence since it is free from a correlation with the error term. This peer
e¤ect is a function of both endogenous and exogenous peer structural parameters
and these e¤ects are not disentangled in this paper.
4 Results
4.1 Random Assignment
The key identifying assumption of our study is that, conditional upon the major-
class of study, students were randomly assigned to classrooms. USP uses a ran-
domizing procedure and we now check whether it had this e¤ect. We perform the
test proposed by Sacerdote (2001), regressing the peer characteristics of interest on
the corresponding average of their peers. Since classrooms are small, even under
20 i.e., since these are determined by the realization of the past classroom assignment lottery.
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random assignment, a negative correlation might be expected.21 To control for this,
we applied the correction proposed by Guryan et al. (2009). They conclude that
it su¢ ces to include in the typical test the average value of the characteristic being
inspected among all students in the same major-class, excluding individual i (zt 1m i).
The modied test corresponds to:
ztmci =  + z
t 1
c i + z
t 1
m i + 
t 1
m + "
t
mci (4)
where ztmci is the outcome of individual i, enrolled in major-class m, who takes
classes in the rst college term in classroom c. The variable zt 1c i is a peer measure
based on the average characteristics of classmates while attending college in the rst
term, excluding himself and t 1m are major-class xed e¤ects.
If peers are assigned randomly, the coe¢ cient  should not be statistically sig-
nicant. Results are reported in Table 2. Each row represents a dependent variable
and each entry reports coe¢ cient estimates from a di¤erent regression. The specic
results for the modied Sacerdote test (from equation 4) are presented in the entries
in bold (row V, column V, for V=1 to 3). The coe¢ cients for the peer variables are
not statistically di¤erent from zero, thus supporting the assumption that selection is
not a¤ecting our main results.22 We also checked whether changes in the proportion
of politically engaged peers (according to the two measures) were systematically
correlated with other predetermined characteristics (to rule out other possible con-
founding peer e¤ects to the ones we investigate). We estimate (4), but use, as
21As explained by Guryan et al. (2009), this stems from the fact that individuals cannot be their
own peers. [T]he sampling of peers [in classrooms] is done without replacement the individual
himself is removed from the urnfrom which his peers are chosen.
22It is important to note that these results hold on average for students assigned by di¤erent
rules namely, random algorithm or alphabetical order. There is evidence in the US that rst
names convey individuals demographic characteristics (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004). To
understand whether a similar pattern was a¤ecting our exercise, we looked for di¤erences in class-
matescharacteristics according to the rst letter of their rst name (i.e., classroom assignment).
In results not shown in the paper, we nd that classmatescharacteristics do not di¤er by name
allocation for any of the observed characteristics.
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dependent variables, demographic characteristics and political behavior variables.
The results are reported in Table 2, not in bold, in rows 1-11.
Table2
The right-wing and partisan parent peer variables are not related to students
media consumption of politics or intention to invalidate their votes. There is a
negative association between the proportion of classmates with a partisan parent
and studentspropensity to identify themselves as right-wing. This association might
arise for two reasons: (i) luck or (ii) because some students felt afraid of declaring
themselves to be right-wing-oriented. The latter would be worrying but the same
correlation, which would be expected under (ii), is not observed among students
propensity to declare themselves to be right-wing-oriented and the proportion of
classmates that are right-wing. Nevertheless, we also include classmatesaverage
characteristics as additional controls in the main regressions.
4.2 Peer Political A¢ liation E¤ects on Individual Political
A¢ liation and Engagement
Table 3 provides the estimates of a version of equation (3)23 using as dependent
variable, an indicator for whether the individual self declares as right-wing in t
and focusing on the inuence of peers with right wing identication. Each column
reports a separate regression that di¤ers according to the controls.
Table3
Our preferred and most complete specication is in column 4 where we control
for possible sources of selection bias by including in the regressions indicators for
gender, race, age, income, mother education, political identication at t-1, the pro-
portion of classmates that declared to have a partisan parent in t-1, and major-class
xed e¤ects. We do not detect any peer e¤ect. The coe¢ cient on the propor-
tion of right-wing classmates is practically equal to zero and it is not statistically
23We add major class xed e¤ects (t 1m ) to this equation.
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signicant. The results for regressions using individual left-wing identication as
dependent variable mirror the ones reported here and, for reasons of space, are not
presented. As additional robustness test, we conducted regressions replicating the
specication in column 4, and using as dependent variables, indicators for whether
the student is concerned about right-wing issues in t. These are taxes, corruption
in the government, violence. We also examine the likelihood of concern in t with
left-wing issues, which are poverty, quality of public schools and public transporta-
tion. As shown in Table A6 in the eletronic Appendix, the peer coe¢ cient is not
statistically signicant for any issue.
We also considered more complex possible peer political identication e¤ects.
First, we test for an interaction term between the peer right-wing identication and
an indicator for whether the student self-declared right-wing in t-1 (Table 3, column
5). The purpose was to check whether peer e¤ects worked specically by reinforcing
studentspre-determined preferences. Second, in Table 3, column 6, we add to the
regression a peer variable that is the proportion of classmates that both self-declare
right-wing and have a partisan parent in t-1. This is to test for the possibility that
individuals are a¤ected by the preference of their engaged peers.24 Again, we nd
no statistically signicant e¤ects. Third, in Table 3, column 7, we extend this test
to see whether this possible version of the peer e¤ect operates on the less engaged by
interacting the proportion of right-wing with partisan parent with an indicator for
when an individual does not have a partisan parent. The coe¢ cient for this variable
is not signicant.
We report further robustness checks in the online Appendix. We decompose
the peer variable into intervals over the full range and re-run the regressions to
check for peer e¤ects in any of these intervals of the full range (see Table A7 in
the eletronic Appendix). None are signicant. Finally we checked the robustness
of this result by switching the dependent variable to a preference for a particular
party (the PSDB-Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira) and the associated peer
24In so far as engaged peers provide a richer network for political discussion, one might also
expect from the evidence in Satyanath et al. (2017) on the early dissemination of Nazi views in
Germany that there would be this interaction.
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e¤ect variable being the proportion of classmates who expressed preference for this
party.25 The conclusions are broadly the same (see Table A8 in the online Appendix).
Reassuringly, in all these regressions we nd that individualsown pre-determined
political identication are important in explaining political identication in t.
Result 1: There is no evidence that the political identication of an individual
is a¤ected by the political identication of his or her peers.
In comparing these ndings with those in Table 3, columns 1 and 2, we check
whether this result is sensitive to the control for selection biases. We nd it is. If
there is no control for choice of subject major-class (recall, that at this level, stu-
dents are randomly assigned to classrooms), and there is only control for individual
demographic characteristics and pre-determined political preferences, the peer po-
litical identication variable becomes signicant and positive. In other words, in
the absence of random assignment, it appears that peers do a¤ect an individuals
political identication.
Result 2: The failure to control for selection biases creates the (false) im-
pression that an individuals political identication is inuenced by the political
identication of his or her peers.
Table 4 gives the analogous regressions that test for a possible inuence of peer
political a¢ liation on individual knowledge, participation and the consumption of
media. Each row represents a separate regression on that individual outcome and
reports on the coe¢ cient of the peer variable. Column 1 gives the results for the
proportion of right-wing classmates peer variable, with the full set of controls. We
nd no statistically signicant impacts, except for an increase in consumption of
politics in the internet (row 8).
There is a literature concerned with whether individuals are inuenced by het-
erogeneity of political views in their group. Mutz (2002a), for example, suggests that
people become confused in the presence of disagreements and so tend to participate
less politically when in a heterogeneous group. We examine these possibilities for
our group of students by replicating the regression in column 1, Table 4, but using
25We only present results for preference for the PSDB party because, in our data, there was no
change in the preference for another party between the two surveys.
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Mutzs peer variable for the heterogeneity within the network (the proportion of
classmates that have an opposite ideology.26)
The results are in Table 4, column 2. Contrary to Mutz (2002a), we nd that
ideological heterogeneity among classmates discourages casting an invalid vote and
increases media consumption. These results are also important for countering wor-
ries that heterogeneity can weaken peer e¤ects because they occur most strongly
between those who are already alike in some respects (as in Carrell et al. 2013).
Result 3: There is evidence that heterogeneity of political a¢ liation among
peers encourages individual consumption of the media and discourages casting in-
valid votes.
Table 4
4.3 Peer Engagement E¤ects on Individual Engagement and
Political A¢ liation
Table 5 presents the results of the regressions that test for whether either of our two
peer engagement variables (proportions, excluding self, of classmates with partisan
parents and of classmates intending to watch campaign on TV) inuence individual
engagement, political a¢ liation, knowledge and consumption of the media. Each
entry again reports a separate regression result for the peer coe¢ cient (distinguished
in the column), on the dependent variable identied in the row. All regressions
include controls for gender, race, age, income and mother education indicators,
political identication at t-1, a dummy for whether the student declared to have a
partisan parent in t-1, major-class xed e¤ects and for the other peer variable (i.e.
the proportions of classmates that declared to be right-wing and left-wing oriented
in t-1).
26For instance, if the individual is right-wing we compute the proportion of students in the
classroom that are left-wing or center-oriented. We then aggregate this individual measure to a
peer variable as described before.
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Table 5
The one peer e¤ect that is consistently statistically signicant over the peer
engagement specications is the movement of individual political a¢ liation to the
Centre. With the partisan parent peer variable, there is also evidence of an e¤ect on
political participation. There is also some evidence from the watch campaign peer
variable that peer engagement improves individual knowledge (by reducing asym-
metric mistakes over candidates). But there is no evidence that peer engagement
encourages media consumption because the only signicant coe¢ cient is negative
(follow politics on the internetwith the watch political campaignpeer variable).
Result 4: There is evidence that peer political engagement encourages a move-
ment of political a¢ liation to the Centre (away from the extremes). There is weaker
evidence that peer political engagement encourages valid voting and political knowl-
edge.
Result 5: There is no evidence that peer engagement encourages consumption
of the media.
5 Discussion
Our results are important in three respects.
First, we contribute to the debate in the literature over whether peer political
identication a¤ects individual political identication. There is mixed evidence on
this: e.g. Mackuen and Brown (1987), on one side and Kenny (1994), Beck (2002),
and Sinclair (2009), on the other suggesting that there is an inuence. We nd no
evidence of such an e¤ect (Result 1). Crucially, the earlier studies rely on correlations
that do not control systematically for prior commonalities. In contrast, we are able
through the use of the experimental method to control for these selection biases,
by comparing behaviours among individuals randomly assigned to di¤erent peer
groups. This is important not only because, once we control for these sources of
similarity, we nd no peer political a¢ liation e¤ect, but also because our study
suggests that the failure to control fully for these selection biases is, in practice,
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material (Result 2). It is material in the sense that the correlations without controls
appear statistically signicant and of considerable magnitude: an increase of 10%
in the right-wing class mates would appear to increase by 3-4% the chance of an
individual declaring a right-wing political a¢ liation. Once we control for selection
biases, this predictive power of the peer political identication disappears, yielding a
very di¤erent conclusion. The absence of a peer e¤ect is all the more notable in the
context of the Angrist (2014) critique of the Sacerdote (2001) identication strategy:
that is, that it can still produce a positive peer coe¢ cient when none exists.
Second, we nd some weak evidence across the specications for the peer engage-
ment variable that students are less likely to cast invalid votes when their peers are
more engaged (Result 4). In this respect, our ndings echo a result in the literature
with respect to social contagion in voting (Gerber et al. 2008, Nickerson, 2008).27
27We replicated the test proposed by Angrist (2014) and nd support for this part of Result 4.
The idea behind the test, although not without controversy (see Feld and Zölitz,2017), is that when
pre-determined peer characteristics are included in a model that explains individual characteristics
with peer e¤ects, the presence of peer e¤ects in the econometric sense is identical to that of a
2SLS estimator using group dummies as instrument for individual characteristics. This, in turn,
is di¤erent from OLS estimates of the e¤ect of these individual characteristics. In particular, the
condition for peer e¤ects to be present is that the 2SLS estimates should exceed the OLS estimates.
Consider the following OLS regression:
yig = + 0xi + 1xg + "i
Acemoglu and Angrist (2001) have shown that the parameter 1 is equal to 1 = ( IV  
 OLS)  ( IV   OLS) , where  OLS corresponds to the coe¢ cient of a regression of yig on xi and
 IV is equal to the coe¢ cient of xi in a 2SLS IV regression of yig on xi but using group dummies
as instruments for xi: Note that  = 11 R2 and it is in general close to one, since R
2 tends to be
close to zero. So, the peer e¤ects estimator is approximately equal to the di¤erence between the
IV and OLS estimator
This is the test that we conduct and show in Table A9 in the Appendix. In our case, we analyse
the peer e¤ect of political engagement and the group dummies correspond to classroom dummies.
We nd that  IV >  OLS ; indicating the presence of peer e¤ects. (However, not only peer e¤ects,
but all factors that lead to a di¤erence between  OLS e  IV also a¤ect 1 such as measurement
error, as Feld and Zölitz (2017) discuss. They also argument that in the case of random assignment
the impact of measurement errors are small and peer e¤ects tend to be better estimated).
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Third, we nd a robust peer e¤ect across the specications for the peer engage-
ment variable on individual political identication. Students with more engaged
classmates tend to move to the Centre of the political spectrum and become less
likely to invalidate their votes. The result is particularly interesting because it goes
against the suggestion that these types of peer e¤ects tend to reinforce initial beliefs
and preferences (see Gerber et al., 2012). One possible interpretation of our nding
is that students acquire information about the candidates through peer contacts and
when our students become better informed, they happen to identify more strongly
with the Centre of the political spectrum. However, there is no evidence that the
students consumed more media and only weak evidence that students became better
informed about the candidates as a result of having engaged peers. So this seems
unlikely. Since we nd no evidence for peer political identication e¤ects and any-
way this is a peer engagement e¤ect on movement to the Centre of the political
spectrum, neither can this result be readily assimilated to some form of contagion
of political preferences.
One possible explanation, however, is that an engaged group of students discusses
politics more and this helps clarify what it means to be located on the left-right
political spectrum. Such clarication will naturally produce a regression to the
mean: that is the Centre in this context. If the degree of clarication depends
on the intensity of the discussion and this in turns depends on how the level of
engagement in the class, then this would explain the result.
There is an interesting sense in which this possibility also blurs the distinction
between peer e¤ects that arise through information and those that occur through
some kind of preference contagion or osmosis. This is an informational channel but
it works on individual preferences. When peoples preferences are supported by
beliefs that are not held with certainty, then peer discussion has epistemic e¤ects
that are revealed in preference changes.
In short, our results are important because they suggest that there are signicant
peer inuences on individuals but they are not the ones that encourage worries
for democracy on grounds of group-think. Indeed, the reverse is the case. An
individuals political identication is not a¤ected by that of their peers in our natural
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experiment. Peer political engagement does a¤ect individual political identication.
But this most plausibly occurs by attenuating the uncertainty over what being left or
right-wing means on this spectrum and, as a result, we observe that peer engagement
encourages political identication away from the extremes towards the Centre. In
so far as this is right, then these peer e¤ects, far from damaging democracies, are
likely to be benecial because the range of dispute that democracy has to bridge
narrows.
6 Conclusion
Using a natural experiment on young adults, we examine whether peers inuence
individual preferences over political a¢ liation and political engagement. The par-
ticular question is important because one appeal of democracy in terms of its re-
sponsiveness to the will of the peopledepends on being able to identify individuals
with their preferences. If an individuals preferences depend on his or her peers,
then individual willin this sense has slipped its anchor in the individual. But it is
also an instance of a general question that has wider importance for social science.
For instance, much of economics takes individual preferences as given, the starting
point for analysis, so to speak, and it would be equally damaging here to discover
that an individuals preferences oated with those of their peers.
The choice of survey participants is important for our test. Our participants
were young adults, embarking on a new, important and unfamiliar phase in their
lives. These are precisely the uncertain and portentous circumstances where, psy-
chologically, one might expect individual sensitivity to the cues of other. In this
sense, our natural experiment was on a pool of participants where, if there are peer
e¤ects, one might expect to nd them.
We do. An individuals political identication is associated with the identi-
cation of his or her peer group in our data; and so too is an individuals political
identication with the engagement of his or her peers. However, for di¤erent reasons,
we argue that neither association should trouble liberal democracies; nor sound a
more general warning bell for those who take individual preferences as given.
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In the case of the correlation between peer political identication and individual
political identication on a left-right scale, this is because we nd that it disappears
once we control for selection biases in the way that groups are constituted. This
is an important result. Methodologically it is important because it suggests that
the issues identied by, for example, Sacerdote (2001) can be material in creating
the false impression of peer e¤ects when there are none. Substantively, the result is
important because a direct inuence on individual political identication from peer
political identication could be particularly damaging for the political process.
The inuence of the level of peer political engagement on individual political
identication both survives these controls and is robust to di¤erent measures of
peer engagement. It is real, in this sense. It also interestingly encourages movement
to the Centre of the political spectrum. We argue, for a variety of reasons, that this
is best explained through the likely occurrence of discussion among more engaged
peers that helps clarify for individuals what being left and right-wing mean. This
should not worry supporters of democracy. Indeed, in so far as democracy functions
with less di¢ culty when views are less polarised, then this peer e¤ect is likely to be
good for democracies.
Supplementary material
Supplementary material (the Appendix and the data les) is available online at
the OUP website.
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Mean Stand Dev Min Max Obs
Panel A: Pre-determined characteristics and preferences
Female 0.490 0.490 0 1 622
White 0.781 0.414 0 1 622
Mother has a college degree 0.620 0.486 0 1 625
Have a partisan parent 0.448 0.498 0 1 620
Age 20.880 5.008 17 60 626
Right-wing 0.229 0.421 0 1 623
Centre 0.401 0.490 0 1 623
Intends to Cast and Invalid Vote 0.168 0.374 0 1 622
Intends to watch Political Campaign on TV 0.451 0.498 0 1 627
Panel B: Outcomes
Cast an Invalid Vote 0.058 0.233 0 1 625
% correct answers in the quiz 0.711 0.188 0 1 635
Asymmetric Mistakes 1.704 1.367 0 6 635
Mistakes on Own Intended Candidate 0.267 0.105 0.143 0.571 486
Mistakes on Remaining Candidates 0.285 0.096 0.143 0.714 622
Right-wing 0.240 0.427 0 1 622
Centre 0.363 0.481 0 1 622
No of days follows politics on TV 3.492 2.126 0 7 632
No of days follows politics on newspapers 2.590 2.168 0 7 630
No of days follows politics on internet 4.623 2.152 0 7 631
Panel C:  Classroom Composition (Peer variables)
Have a partisan parent 0.432 0.080 0.25 0.63 48
Intend to watch political campaign 0.426 0.119 0.20 0.75 48
Right-wing oriented 0.189 0.126 0.03 0.50 48
Number of Respondents (in t-1) 33.188 11.164 12 65 48
Note:  The sample refers to students in the panel. 
Table 1 – Summary Statistics Individual and Classroom Level
Right-Wing Has a partisan parent Watch political campaign
Dependent Variable [1] [2] [3]
[1] Right-wing        0.090  -0.2309*       -0.047  
     (0.082)  (0.119)      (0.162)  
[2] Has a partisan parent       -0.276** -0.0500        0.236  
     (0.110)  (0.1146)      (0.150)  
[3] Intends to watch Political Campaign on TV       -0.086  0.2056       -0.128  
     (0.224)  (0.1464)      (0.115)  
[4] Number of days follows politics on TV       -0.010  -0.2296       -1.001  
(1.083) (0.718)      (0.832)  
[5] Intends to cast an invalid vote        0.025  0.0107        0.253*
     (0.138)  (0.125)      (0.143)  
[6] Evaluation of Lula Government (0-10) 1.028 0.799 -0.326
     (0.740) (1.165) (0.904)
[7] Centre-oriented        0.007  -0.3510*       -0.189  
     (0.208)  (0.184)      (0.184)  
Demographics
[8] Female       -0.182  -0.1183        0.249  
     (0.179)  (0.239)      (0.162)  
[9] Mother has a college degree       -0.102  0.0343        0.160  
     (0.193)  (0.130)      (0.136)  
[10] Age -2.733 1.7415       -2.098  
(2.721) (4.355)      (3.007)  
[11] White        0.147  0.0203       -0.106  
     (0.143)  (0.136)      (0.134)  
Notes: 1) The Table reports OLS estimates from separate regressions of the relevant pre-determined individual characteristics 
on respective peer variables. Each entry represents an estimate from a different regression.
All regressions include  major-class fixed effects and average value of the peer characteristics among students in the same  
major-class (excluding himself). 2) Standard errors clustered at the classroom level are in brackets.
3) ** Statistically significant at 5%; * Statistically significant at 10%
Table 2 - Tests for Random Assignment of Peers Among Classrooms
Coefficient [Stand Error] on Peer Variable:
Selected Controls ( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) ( 4 ) (5) (6) (7)
Peer Variables
% Right-Wing Classmates        0.372**        0.332**       -0.065        -0.204        -0.265        -0.251  
     (0.099)       (0.113)       (0.237)       (0.263)       (0.263)       (0.277)  
% Right-Wing Classmates X Right-wing        0.254                
     (0.371)                
% Right-Wing Classmates X        0.079  
Does Not Have a Partisan Parent                    (0.176)  
              
% Right-Wing Classmates with a Partisan Parent                                   -0.254  
                                 (0.337)  
% Right-Wing Classmates with a Partisan Parent X                                    0.112  
Does Not Have a Partisan Parent                                  (0.339)  
                            
Pre-determined ideologies               
Right-wing        0.528**        0.526**        0.508**        0.513**        0.442**        0.513**        0.514**
     (0.043)       (0.046)       (0.049)       (0.048)       (0.123)       (0.049)       (0.049)  
Left-wing       -0.096**       -0.106**       -0.106**       -0.099**       -0.100**       -0.099**       -0.099**
     (0.025)       (0.025)       (0.027)       (0.027)       (0.027)       (0.027)       (0.027)  
Centre (omitted)
Additional Controls
Individual characteristics no yes yes yes yes yes yes
% Classmates with a Partisan Parent no no no yes yes yes yes
Major-Class Fixed effects no no yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 612 563 563 563 563 563 563
Notes: 1) Each column represents the result from a separate OLS regression. 2) Standard errors in brackets are clustered at the classroom level.
3) Individual characteristics include gender, race, age, income, mother education and indicadors for students’ pre-determined 
inclination: right- and left-wing.
4) ** Statistically significant at 5%; * Statistically significant at 10%
Table 3: Impact of Classmates' Ideologies on Students Political Orientations
 Dependent Variable: Self-declaring Right-wing by Election Time 
% Right - Wing Classmates % Opposite Ideology Classmates
Dependent Variables: [ 1 ] [ 2 ]
Voting Participation and Political Knowledge
[1] Cast an Invalid Vote       -0.108        -0.104*
     (0.137)       (0.055)  
         563           563  
[2] % Correct Answer in the Quiz        0.078         0.028  
     (0.117)       (0.047)  
         573           573  
[3] Asymmetric Mistakes        0.834         0.536  
     (0.664)       (0.328)  
         573           573  
[4] Mistakes on Own Intended Candidate       -0.028        -0.033  
     (0.099)       (0.028)  
         444           444  
[5] Mistakes on Remaining Candidates        0.057         0.002  
     (0.060)       (0.022)  
         564           564  
Consumption of Media
[6] Number of days follows politics on TV -1.592        0.164  
(1.147)      (0.695)  
         570           570  
[7] Number of days follows politics on Newspaper 1.366       -0.225  
(1.343)      (0.588)  
         568           568  
[8] Number of days follows politics on Internet        3.494**        1.227** 
     (1.296)       (0.595)  
         570           570  
Individual Characteristics yes yes
% Classmates with a Partisan Parent yes yes
Major-Class Fixed effects yes yes
Notes: 1) Each entry represents the result from a separate OLS regression. 2) Standard errors in brackets 
are clustered at the classroom level.3) Individual characteristics include gender, race, age, income, mother 
education, indicators for students’ pre-determined  political inclination - right- and left-wing and dummies 
indicating whether the student has a partisan parent.4) ** Statistically significant at 5%; * Statistically significant at 10%
 Table 4- Effects of ideology on knowledge and behavior 
Peer Variables
Dependent Variables: [ 1 ] [ 2 ]
Political Knowledge
[1] % Correct answer in the Quiz -0.1099        0.150  
     (0.087)       (0.138)  
571          573  
[2] Asymmetric Mistakes -1.635**        0.635  
     (0.629)       (0.930)  
571          573  
[3] Mistakes on Own Intended Candidate -0.0133       -0.095  
     (0.070)       (0.102)  
442          444  
[4] Mistakes on Remaining Candidates 0.0560       -0.093  
     (0.042)       (0.067)  
562          564  
Voting Participation and Ideology
[5] Cast an Invalid Vote 0.029       -0.294** 
     (0.108)       (0.139)  
561          563  
[6] Centre-Oriented 0.372**        0.994**
     (0.178)       (0.298)  
561          563  
Consumption of Media
[7] Number of days follows politics on TV 0.374 -1.043
(0.981) (1.710)
568          570  
[8] Number of days follows politics on Newspaper -0.586 -1.149
(1.320) (1.348)
566          568  
[9] Number of days follows politics on Internet -3.422** 1.916
(1.154) (1.710)
568          570  
Individual Characteristics yes yes
% Right-Wing and % Left-wing Classmates yes yes
Major-Class Fixed effects yes yes
Notes: 1) Each entry represents the result from a separate OLS regression. 2) Standard errors in parenthesiss are clustered at the classroom level.
3) Individual characteristics include gender, race, age, income, mother education, indicators for students’ 
pre-determined  political inclination - right- and left-wing and dummies indicating whether the student intended to watch political advertisement (in column 1),
and has a partisan parent (in column 2).
4) The number of observations in each regression are reported in italics.
5) ** Statistically significant at 5%; * Statistically significant at 10%
Table 5: Effects of Political Engagement on Knowledge and Behavior
% Classmates intend to watch 
political campaign
% Classmates with a Partisan 
Parent
Coefficient on the Peer Variable
